Norwegian University of Science and Technology Department of Electronics and Telecommunications
  Jolly Phi    
        University Graduate Center in Kjeller  
 
   
   Artem Vakhitov in Quantum Cryptography lab
Are you interested in quantum cryptography experiments or quantum information theory? Excellent students with relevant background in experimental photonics, electronics, quantum physics and information theory (note: background only in classical information theory, computer science and security is not sufficient) are welcome to apply for a stay in our group. We have a number of ideas for your Master thesis or a shorter project.

Both local and foreign students are encouraged to contact us. Local students are accepted based solely on relevent educational background; we can take students from several departments and study programs (e.g., electronics, physics, nanotechnology, photonics). Foreign students not already located in Norway will be considered if they have very good grades (average >B on the ECTS grading scale, >4.5 on Russian grading scale), right background, and if a suitable scholarship is found; we’ll try to help with the latter.

Below are project descriptions we have been listing in our department’s catalogs of available topics. These descriptions are updated typically twice a year when a new catalog is being compiled, in November and in April. To get updated information at other times of the year and to discuss other possible topics in our group, please take contact.

2012

Quantum key distribution, quantum hacking, and security proofs

Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables completely secure communication, at least in theory. Implementations necessarily contain imperfections, which can be exploited by eavesdroppers. Such eavesdropping has been demonstrated in our recent experiments, exploiting imperfections of single-photon detectors. Nevertheless, this does not mean that QKD cannot be made secure, it just means that the imperfections must be taken into account in so-called security proofs. Then a secret key can be regained by a sufficiently large amount of key compression (privacy amplification).

At present nobody knows how detectors can be made hack-proof. We have developed a proposal to test their single photon sensitivity at random times; however, the frequency of testing and statistics of results must be incorporated into a security proof. The student's task will be to fill this gap between a proposed, practical solution, and an existing theoretical security proof. Such a solution will be highly interesting in this field of research, and may be implemented experimentally once its theory has been developed.

Student location: UNIK (Kjeller) or NTNU Gløshaugen.
Contact: Prof. Johannes Skaar (email; tel. 64844748).

2011

Hacking / hack-proofing commercial quantum key distribution system

We have a state-of-the-art quantum key distribution equipment, system Clavis2 from the leading manufacturer ID Quantique, in our lab. Althought we have recently hacked it, there is a room to explore other vulnerabilities. Also, there are different ideas how to patch it against hacks, which can be tested (for example, the patch described in preprint arXiv:1101.5698 can be implemented). Both hacking and testing countermeasures is very important for hardening quantum cryptography for real-world use, and this effort is supported by the manufacturer of the system.

Student location: NTNU Gløshaugen.
Contact: Vadim Makarov (makarov@vad1.com) or Prof. Johannes Skaar (email; tel. 64844748).

Laser damage as a tool for eavesdropping in quantum cryptography

The student will experimentally investigate effects and mechanisms of laser damage in optical components used in quantum cryptography systems. Potential of the laser damage effects to assist an eavesdropper will be assessed and/or demonstrated.

Two students have already started on this topic early in 2011. There might be a room for one more, subject to a discussion. Please also consider other topics.
Student location: NTNU Gløshaugen.
Contact: Vadim Makarov (makarov@vad1.com) or Prof. Johannes Skaar (email; tel. 64844748).

Hacking / hack-proofing single photon detectors

Many of today’s quantum key distribution (QKD) systems use single photon detectors based on avalanche photodiodes (APDs). We have demonstrated that electronic circuits in most of these detectors can be forced into unexpected operating regimes by an eavesdropper shining bright light into the detector, instead of single photons. These operating regimes can be used for eavesdropping.

In this project, the student can choose to wear either a black hat or a white hat. (Or both hats, if you manage it.) The black hat choice is to continue cracking detectors, for which several different experiments are possible. All these cracking experiments involve work with an optical setup and with electronics in the detector. The white hat choice is to try to modify detector electronics such that it becomes impossible for anyone to crack it. This can be done on different detector models and includes optical testing (to prove that your patch works).

The student will work with mixed analog-digital electronics, learn how QKD systems operate, how the detectors are used in them and how to eavesdrop by exploiting detector weaknesses. Ability to reverse-engineer and fully understand detector electronics is required; with an electronics background, it can be learned during the project.

More information is available in a 50 min lecture on YouTube (given at Hacking at Random conference in 2009) that introduces QKD, then presents one of our detector hacking experiments.

On the following pictures, you can see a commercial detector disassembled, and a part of our hacker’s toolkit that we use in experiments.
PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR module disassembled Fiber-optic hacker’s toolkit

Student location: NTNU Gløshaugen.
Contact: Vadim Makarov (makarov@vad1.com) or Prof. Johannes Skaar (email; tel. 64844748).

Software design for quantum cryptosystem

In principle quantum cryptography can be used to communicate unconditionally secure. Implementations, however, contain several imperfections, some of which can compromise the security of the system.

Quantum cryptography protocols consist of two parts. First, single photons are sent over an optical fiber to generate a so-called raw key. This raw key contains errors and a signature of possible eavesdropping attempts. In the second classical part of the protocol, the key is corrected (error correction) and any information obtained by eavesdroppers is removed (privacy amplification). This stage of the protocol uses a classical, authenticated communication channel, usually the internet.

The task is to study the privacy amplification in detail, including estimation of hardware parameters that affect security, and implement these parts of the protocol. The software can be run on a commercial QKD platform Clavis2, which we have.

Student location: UNIK (Kjeller) or NTNU Gløshaugen.
Contact: Prof. Johannes Skaar (email; tel. 64844748).

Quantum information theory and quantum key distribution

Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables completely secure communication, at least in theory. Implementations necessarily contain imperfections, which can be exploited by eavesdroppers. Such eavesdropping has been demonstrated in our recent experiments. Nevertheless, this does not mean that QKD cannot be made secure, it just means that the imperfections must be taken into account in so-called security proofs. Then a secret key can be regained by a sufficiently large amount of key compression (privacy amplification).

We have available tasks in the field of quantum information theory and quantum key distribution: Theoretical tasks (security proofs and analysis, programming) and experimental tasks (see above proposals). To do a theoretical project, the student needs background in quantum mechanics and/or interest for mathematics. You will learn quantum information theory.

Student location: UNIK (Kjeller) or NTNU Gløshaugen.
Contact: Prof. Johannes Skaar (email; tel. 64844748).

 
Quantum Hacking group on a trip to Grønlia (2008)
 
 Eve :(